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Unlike previous studies on the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), which 
examined either trade or income effects by using forecasted trade values, this paper 
investigates the impact of NAFTA on both bilateral trade and income of each member 
country - US, Canada, and Mexico - by using historical data. This paper covers time series 
data before and after NAFTA was formed, from 1980 to 1999. We consider NAFTA as a 
prolonged impulse function in international trade activities among the three trading partners 
by employing an intervention-function model. Findings reveal that NAFTA increases 
bilateral trade between US-Canada and US-Mexico, and in terms of income, NAFTA 
benefits Canada the most “certainly”. To substantiate these findings, Granger causality 
analysis is employed, which in turn supports our intervention-function results. 
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1.  I NTRODUCTION 
 
Unlike previous studies on the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), 
which examined either trade or income effects by using forecasted trade values, this 
paper investigates the impact of NAFTA on both bilateral trade and per capita income 
(as measured by the per capita gross domestic product - GDP) of each member country 
(US, Canada and Mexico) by u sing historical data. This paper covers time series data 
before and after NAFTA was formed, from 1980 to 1999. We consider NAFTA as a 
prolonged impulse function in international trade activities among the three trading 
partners by employing an intervention-function model. 
An extensive body of research has been conducted on NAFTA and its impact on 
member countries. However, most of this research relied on forecasted values, employed 
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applied general equilibrium models (AGE) - for economy-wide effects, or used simple 
gravity models - for trade effects. Most of those forecasted values of trade fell short 
from reality. For instance, Casario (1996) used Vector Autoregression (VAR) model to 
assess the impact of NAFTA on bilateral trade among member countries, and forecasted 
a decrease in US trade deficit with Canada and, more surprisingly, an increase in US 
trade surplus with Mexico. While in fact, US trade deficit with Canada and Mexico 
jumped to $36 billion and $23.12 billion in 1999, respectively. 
In addition, the mainstream literature on NAFTA’s economy-wide effects that 
mostly adopted AGE models (Brown  et al.  (1992), Cox and Harris  (1992), Sobarzo 
(1992), and Markusen et al. (1995)) encompasses methodological concerns raised by 
many economists. These concerns are that AGE results reflect more about model 
structure and parameter specification than the consequences of NAFTA. 
Other previous studies also assessed the impact of NAFTA on trade creation or 
diversion by employing gravity models. However, in a more recent work, Matyas (1997) 
argued against the use of regional dummy variable(s) to test the hypothesis that trading 
blocs significantly explain trade volumes. He showed that gravity models used to test 
regional blocs are mis-specified from an econometric point o f view, which leads to 
incorrect interpretation of the dummy regional variable(s) and improper economic 
inference. 
The contribution of this paper lies in the use of intervention-function model, which 
allows us to isolate the impact of NAFTA on both, bilateral trade and per capita income 
(i.e., per capita GDP) effects of all three member-countries. Also, the use of historical 
data from 1980 to 1999, though not enough time for more reliable inferences, still gives 
more robustness than the use of forecasted data. This 20-year period covers the year 
1993 when NAFTA was signed, while isolating and eliminating the effect of the 
US-Canada Free Trade Agreement (FTA), which went into effect in 1989. Having said 
that, it is normal to note here that the US-Canada FTA of 1989 was extended in 1993 to 
include Mexico, forming the NAFTA bloc. 
Although more time is needed before a clearer assessment of NAFTA’s impact is 
made, still this paper attempts to shed light on this controversial topic. In fact, opponents 
and proponents of NAFTA are still debating about its trade and welfare outcomes. 
Nevertheless, this paper examines the impact of NAFTA on bilateral trade and GDP 
among member countries. It attempts to find out which country is benefiting the most 
from NAFTA, in terms of trade creation and income, respectively. 
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: Section  2 reviews the streamline 
literature on NAFTA and its impact on trade and income. Section  3 discusses the 
methodology and the specification of the intervention-function model. Section  4 
analyzes the findings. Finally, Section 5 provides a conclusion with policy implications 
of the results. 
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2.  OVERVIEW 
 
Although NAFTA is no longer a front-page topic, however, its controversial nature 
is still ailing among economists as well as politicians. The bulk of research that has been 
done on NAFTA dates back mainly between 1992 and 1995. A somehow comprehensive 
work on NAFTA (mainly pro-NAFTA) compiles the early AGE studies on the 
agreement (Lustig et al. (1992)). Both opponents and proponents of the 1993 agreement 
are still not satisfied with the empirical results mainly due to the insufficient time needed 
before getting a clearer view of the agreement’s impact. Mixed results and contradicting 
claims regarding its economic benefits on the participating nations remain to be issues of 
debate. 
For instance, Ensign (1997) reported that regarding the impact of NAFTA, the 
Brookings Institution found that NAFTA has significantly improved economies by 
creating more jobs; whereas reports of the Economic Policy Institute claimed that the 
agreement has caused more job and income losses. Similarly, Gagne (2000) documented 
in a recent paper that FTA and NAFTA had a mixed record, both in their working and 
impact. 
Most of the empirical studies on assessing the NAFTA’s impact employed static 
AGE models to predict the income effect of its member countries. Brown et al. (1992) 
examined the NAFTA’s impact on all three national economies; Cox and Harris (1992) 
focused on Canada; Sobarzo (1992) focused on Mexico; and Markusen et al. (1995) 
analyzed the agreement’s effect on the automobile industry - which accounts for a major 
portion of trade in North America. All these researchers predicted that the impact of 
NAFTA on Mexico’s per capita income will be the biggest followed by a very small 
effect on the US economy. They also found that Canada will notice no increase beyond 
what it experiences as a result of its free trade agreement with the US, which went into 
effect in 1989. In the same context of NAFTA’s effect on income, Panagariya (1996) 
postulated that because the US had little tariff preferences to grant to Mexico while the 
reverse was not true, the static welfare effect of NAFTA is likely to be positive on the 
former and negative on the latter. 
Other studies explored the effects of NAFTA on trade. For instance, Casario (1996) 
estimated the effects of NAFTA on bilateral trade between the US and Canada and 
between the US and Mexico using a VAR model. She found trade creation results for all 
three countries (in particular, an increase in US exports) and an improvement in the US 
trade position with both Canada and Mexico. Other studies used gravity models to 
estimate the agreement’s impact on trade flows; however, Matyas (1997) criticized the 
use of gravity models to test regional blocs. He argued that dealing with trading blocs as 
a dummy variable in gravity models would lead to an econometric specification error. 
The next section discusses the methodology along with the specification of the 
intervention-function model. 
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3.  METHODOLOGY 
 
This study assesses the impact of NAFTA on bilateral trade and per capita GDP (as a 
proxy for income) of each member country using historical data before and after 
NAFTA was formed. We consider NAFTA as a prolonged intervention in international- 
trade activities among three trading partners; therefore, the direct approach to estimate 
the impact of NAFTA is an intervention-function analysis. 
There are three types of an intervention-function analysis: impulse function, 
gradually changing function, and prolonged impulse function (Ender (1995, p.  272)). 
The impulse function is characterized as a temporary intervention. The effect of this 
intervention may last several periods due to the autoregressive nature of time series data. 
The gradually changing function is the intervention that takes place gradually until it 
reaches its full force at the end. The prolonged impulse function is the intervention that 
prolongs for a long period of time. Since NAFTA is classified as  a prolonged 
intervention starting since 1993, we apply the prolonged impulse function to analyze its 
impact on bilateral trade and GDP of its member countries. 
The general form of prolonged impulse-function regression can be illustrated as 
follows: 
 
t t t t z c y a a y e + + + = - 0 1 1 0 ,                                             (1) 
 
where  t z  denotes the dummy of the prolonged intervention variable, NAFTA, which 
takes on the value of zero before NAFTA and 1 thereafter, the coefficient of  t z  
indicates the impact of the NAFTA, and  t e  denotes a white-noise disturbance. 
The specific form of the above function (1) varies depending on a data generating 
process, e.g., AR, MA, ARIMA, or ARCH. 
Trade flows data for the US-Canada, US-Mexico, and Canada-Mexico are borrowed 
from the Direction of Trade Statistics (DOTS), while real GDP figures are collected 
from the International Financial Statistics (IFS) yearbook published by the International 
Monetary Fund. Exchange rates and GDP deflator figures are also borrowed from the 




4.  EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS 
 
We start the analysis by considering visually the plots of level and differenced series. 
Figures 1 and 2 illustrate the plots of level and differenced series of three bilateral-trade 
series, whereas Figures 3 and 4 show the plots of level and differenced series of three 
GDP series. 
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Figure 2.  Plot of Differenced Trade Series ROCK-ANTOINE MEHANNA AND HANNARONG SHAMSUB  74
 

































Figure 4.  Plot of Differenced GDP Series   
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The plots of the level trade and GDP series in Figures 1 and 3 show the pattern of 
increasing slightly over time. The plots of the differenced series of trade and GDP in 
Figures 2 and 4 do not show substantial fluctuation over time. These suggest that all 
series exhibit neither a structural break nor volatility pattern. Canadian GDP seems to 
move downward slightly in 1991, but it increases moderately in 1992. 
Consequently, we test whether each series has a unit root using the Dickey-Fuller 
(1979) unit roots test (see Table 1). From Table 1, we do not reject the null hypothesis 
that all level series contain a unit root. When we perform the test on the first-differenced 
series, we reject the null hypothesis of having a unit root. This indicates that all series 
contain a unit root. 
 
 
Table 1.  Dickey-Fuller Unit Roots Test 
Series  Level   First Difference 
US GDP  0.92  11.198
*** 
Canada GDP  0.493  21.229
*** 
Mexico GDP  1.014  17.780
*** 
US-Canada Trade  1.378  11.827
*** 
US-Mexico Trade  2.874  5.353
*** 
Canada-Mexico Trade  2.353  19.56
*** 
Note: 
*** indicate significance at 1%, based on Dickey-Fuller test. 
 
 
Next, we move to investigate the data generating process that generates each series. 
Since the plots of series do not exhibit a volatility pattern, we use the Box-Jenkin (1976) 
methodology to test whether all series follow an ARIMA process. The results of the 
autocorrelation function (ACF) and partial autocorrelation function (PACF) indicate that 
each series was generated by the AR (1) process. Further, we move to investigate the 
impact of NAFTA on bilateral trade and GDP of each country using the intervention- 
function model (see Table 2).   
 
 
Table 2.  Results of the Intervention-Function Analysis 
PANEL A: TRADE  Intercept  Impact Effect 
CAN-Mexico Trade  1310.7  794.93 
  (2.28)  (1.32) 
US-Canada Trade  101544.4  44416.8
** 
  (5.34)  (2.24) 
US-Mexico Trade  38864.1  27962.2
** 
  (3.08)  (2.15) 
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Table 2.  (Continued) 
PANEL B: GDP  Intercept  Impact Effect 
US GDP  5238.2  405.65 
  (20.29)  (1.51) 
Canada GDP  457.93  25.39
*** 
  (10.90)  (5.80) 
Mexico GDP  1002.5  78.50 
  (18.56)  (1.36) 
Notes: All series were generated by AR (1) process.  t-statistics  are in parentheses. 
**(
***) indicates 
significance at 5% (1%) level. The impact variable (z) takes on two values: 0 during 1980-1992 and 1 during 
1993-1999. All series were tested at lag length of 1. Lag length was selected based on the results of Akaike 
Information Criterion (AIC) and Schwartz Bayesian Criterion (SBC). 
 
 
Table 2 illustrates the impact of NAFTA on trade and GDP. Panel A shows the 
impact of NAFTA on three pairs of bilateral trade. The results show that the estimated 
coefficients of the intervention variable, NAFTA, are statistically significant (at 95 
percent) on US-Canada trade series and on US-Mexico trade series. This suggests that, 
with 99 percent confidence, NAFTA increases bilateral trade between US-Canada and 
US-Mexico. Conversely, the estimated coefficient of NAFTA is not statistically 
significant on Canada-Mexico trade series, suggesting that NAFTA has no significant 
impact on trade between Canada and Mexico.   
Panel B shows that the coefficient of NAFTA is statistically significant only on 
Canada’s GDP. This implies that NAFTA has a positive and significant impact on 
Canada’s GDP, thus benefiting Canada’s income the most “certainly” (at 99 percent 




Table 3.  Results of Granger Causality Test 
PANEL A: USGDP, F-Tests, Dependent Variable USGDP 
Variable  F-Statistic  Significance 
USGDP  1.2370  0.4484582 
USMEXTRD  0.1171  0.9673621 
USCANTRD  0.0472  0.9935644 
PANEL B: CANGDP, F-Tests, Dependent Variable CANGDP 
Variable  F-Statistic  Significance 
CANGDP  12.1760  0.0337246 
USCANTRD  11.8277  0.0351000 
CANMXTRD  10.3971  0.0418693 
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Table 3.  (Continued) 
PANEL C: MEXGDP, F-Tests, Dependent Variable MEXGDP 
Variable  F-Statistic  Significance 
MEXGDP  3.0561  0.1928230 
USMEXTRD  4.0381  0.1404193 
CANMXTRD  7.2388  0.0678626 
 
 
The causality analysis shows that, in Panel A, US-Mexico and US-Canada trade 
flows do not Granger-cause US’s GDP. In Panel B, US-Canada trade and Canada- 
Mexico trade strongly Granger-cause Canada’s GDP, which confirms the finding in 
Panel B of Table 2. Panel C suggests that Canada-Mexico trade marginally Granger- 
causes Mexico’s GDP. 
In summary, since NAFTA increases bilateral trade between US-Canada and 
US-Mexico but it does not increase  trade flows between Canada-Mexico, we can 
probably say that, in terms of trade creation, NAFTA seems to benefit the US the most 
significantly, while in terms of GDP, NAFTA appears to benefit Canada the most 
certainly.   
It may be useful here to note that by using the intervention model with bilateral trade 
flows and GDP, we are neither attempting to find out the benefits of the respective 
countries by  order nor the  magnitude of the impact of NAFTA as measured by the 
estimated coefficient (z) itself.  Rather, we are simply isolating the impact of NAFTA 
to examine member countries’ bilateral trade and GDP and see if they are significantly 
affected by NAFTA. In other terms, we are measuring the statistical significance of the 
intervention variable, NAFTA, on bilateral flows and GDP, separately. 
 
 
5.  CONCLUSION AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
 
This paper examines the impact of NAFTA on both bilateral trade and GDP of the 
US, Canada, and Mexico for the period 1980-1999 by adopting an intervention-function 
model. This paper is differentiated from other previous studies in that it uses historical 
data and it assesses both trade and income by using a model that isolates the impact of 
NAFTA at a cut off year (1993) while examining its prolonged effect  -  prolonged 
impulse function. 
Findings suggest that, in terms of trade, while all three countries experience some 
tendency for a net trade creation, NAFTA significantly increases bilateral trade flows 
between US-Canada and US-Mexico. For instance, NAFTA impacts the US trade with 
both Mexico and Canada, while Canada-Mexico bilateral trade is insignificantly affected 
by NAFTA. One possible explanation pertinent to the significant US bilateral trade 
finding is its consistence with Panagariya’s (1996) argument that the US’s tariffs were 
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Mexico. The NAFTA’s mechanism is primarily built on lowering tariffs (gradually 
eliminating them) on most traded goods and services among all three countries. 
Therefore,  the US (and perhaps Canada) would benefit more than Mexico for having 
access to a “newly” open market like Mexico. 
Further results indicate that, in terms of income, NAFTA benefits Canada the most 
“certainly”. In addition, Mexico’s trade with NAFTA members has a statistically 
insignificant impact on Mexico’s GDP. The high statistical significance of the Canada 
result implies that we are 99 percent certain that NAFTA has an impact on Canada’s 
GDP. It may be helpful here to note that, in this case, the impact of joining NAFTA (on 
GDP or bilateral trade) is measured by itself and not as a ratio of GDP. Thus, a possible 
descriptive explanation of our results is that NAFTA’s impact on Canada’s GDP is 
probably due to the relatively large role of trade in Canada’s  economy (70 percent in 
1999), in addition to Canada’s large bilateral trade with both the US and Mexico as a 
share of its total trade (82 percent in 1999). 
On the other hand, the US trade share of GDP is only 19 percent, and its NAFTA 
bilateral trade share of total trade is 32 percent. Mexico’s trade portion of GDP is 57 
percent, while its NAFTA bilateral trade percentage of total trade is 73 percent. When 
compared to the US and Canada, this may explain the weak link between NAFTA’s 
bilateral trade and Mexico’s GDP - 14 percent significance with the US trade and 6.7 
percent with the Canada trade portion (see Table 3, Panel C). All above figures are from 
1999.   
In sum, the impact of NAFTA appears to be insignificant on the US’s GDP perhaps 
due to its small share of trade relative to its large economy. While on the other hand, 
NAFTA’s impact on Canada’s GDP seems highly significant. This may be due to the 
relatively large role of trade (especially with the other members of NAFTA) in Canada’s 
economy. 
From a policy perspective, this study suggests that NAFTA seems to be trade 
creating in all three member countries, but most significantly in the US. Additionally, 
NAFTA appears to significantly spurring Canada’s GDP. Surprisingly, the econometric 
results of this paper indicate that NAFTA has no significant impact on the US’s GDP - as 
mentioned above, a plausible explanation could be due to the small (though increasing) 
“direct” role of trade in the US economy. Investigating the factors behind NAFTA’s 
significant impact on Canada’s GDP (and insignificant one on Mexico and the US) could 
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